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COMMENTS

LEGISLATION PROTECTING

CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: ARMOR OF
STEEL OR EGGSHELLS?
Aaron J. Lodge*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Daren and Paula enter into mediation to resolve a
disagreement regarding a private loan. Daren admits he
owes Paula $5,000, and they write an agreement specifying
that he will pay her $500 a month for ten months. The
contract contains all the requirements for a valid, binding
contract. However, it does not include express language
1
allowing disclosure of the communication, nor does it specify
2 Later, Daren breaches the
the agreement as "enforceable."
agreement, and Paula wishes to utilize the contract along
In many
with Daren's admission of debt as evidence.
jurisdictions today, she cannot do so because the contract and
all discussions pursuant to the mediation are confidential and
privileged3 from disclosure at subsequent legal proceedings.
As an alternative to litigation, mediation has gained
increasing popularity through community programs, courtordered mediations, and attorneys specializing in alternative
4
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques. Mediation involves one
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 41. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa
Cruz.
1. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122(a)(1) (West 1997).
2. See id. § 1123(b).
3. See id. § 1119(b). A privilege is a right to refuse to disclose information.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.: DELETED AND SUPERSEDED MATERIALS 503.
4. Alternative dispute resolution is a "catch-all phrase" used to encompass
mediation, negotiation, arbitration, or any other method of resolving disputes
other than litigation. Of these, mediation is "perhaps the most important of the
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or more neutral persons who help facilitate communication
between the disputing parties to reach an agreement.5 The
mediator must remain neutral6 and has no power to impose a
decision on the parties.7
The mediation process has thrived largely because high
costs and lengthy trials burden litigation.8 Litigation often
disempowers clients by turning decision-making power over
to a judge or jury. Verdicts can be severe and may not reflect
the best interests or basic desires of the parties involved. The
imposition of a win/lose model invites antagonism and
extremism; such litigation can even obscure any hope for a
truly satisfactory resolution between parties.9
Mediation provides opportunities which litigation lacks."
Mediation empowers parties to work together to find
otherwise inconceivable solutions." The process encourages
and often elicits honesty and frankness in creating a fair and
equitable resolution for all parties. 2 Mediation allows parties
to carve out highly unique answers from complicated
disputes. Additionally, as compared to litigation, few rules
exist in mediation, making it a tempting resource.
The benefits of mediation have prompted state
alternative dispute resolution processes."
DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION, THEORY AND APPLICATION 203 (1989). For a more thorough
description of ADR, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES
(Bruce

Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).

5. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS (Cal. Dispute
Resolution Council 2000).
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal. Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d
916, 928 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1121 (West 2000)). Note
that

the parties may request the mediator to make evaluative decisions, but
normally the mediator does not have binding authority.

8. See J. KAHALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 40-41 (1986).
9. See Roger C. Clapp, Family Law Disputes Cry Out for Mediated
Settlements, DISP. RESOL. J., May 1998, at 34, 35. From a financial perspective,

it is also possible for all parties to lose. Additionally, litigation often destroys

relationships, where mediation sometimes builds them. See id.
10. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation:
Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common
Pleas
Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 566-71 (1997) (arguing numerous
reasons

why mediation is beneficial and citing many additional resources for further
investigation).

11. See Christopher H. Macturk, Note, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The

Best ProtectionHas Exceptions, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 411, 411-15 (1995).

12. See id.; see also Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
928

(citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1121). Literally hundreds of articles discussing
mediation can be found at the URL <http://www.mediate.com>.
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legislatures to create laws encouraging potential plaintiffs to
The most typical legislation allows
consider mediation.
parties to protect information discussed during mediation as
"privileged," exempting it from future admission in court.
Such provisions resemble the privilege protecting information
shared between attorney and client. 3 Successful mediation
4
thereby
depends upon honest, open communication,'
necessitating legislation providing for confidentiality in
mediation proceedings.
5
Responding to the state level trend toward mediation,'
Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
of
Conference
National
(ADRA), 6 and the
1998
Uniform
the
drafting
is
Law
State
Uniform
on
Commissioners
Both laws attempt to provide
Mediation Act (UMA)."
national direction and encouragement of this alternative
method of dispute resolution.
These legislative gestures encouraging the mediation
8
Is this new
process present new legal uncertainties.'
Will it withstand
protection of confidentiality reliable?
where disputants
exist
circumstances
Do
court?
in
challenges
of mediation
protection
may not desire statutory
communication? Do exceptions to the mediation privilege
exist?
This comment explores the process of mediation, the need
for privileged communication, and the legislation protecting
It discusses several cases that have
confidentiality.' 9
13. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1997).
14. See Macturk, supra note 11, at 411-14; see also STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS, supra note 5, at 8.

15. Privileges can also be found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but they
are not actual law, they merely provide insight. See FED. R. EVID.: DELETED
AND SUPERSEDED MATERIALS 501-12. Federal courts rely on state substantive
law to determine how to apply any privileges. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 651 (1998).
17. Uniform Mediation Act Draft (Nov. 2000) <http://www.mediate.com/
articles/umanovemberdraft.cfm>.

18. One writer expressed this idea well: "Mediation, the newly discovered
panacea for whatever current difficulties we may have with our ancient tried

and tested system of jurisprudence, brings with it a new and potentially
counterproductive phenomenon: the mediation privilege." William H. Stolberg
& Kyle D. Pence, The Mediation Privilege-An Impermeable Wall, 68 FLA. B.J.,

May 1994, at 66, 68.
19. The mediation privilege is a legislative grant protecting confidential
communications made during a mediation. See James L. Knoll, Protecting
Participantsin the Mediation Process: The Role of Privilege and Immunity, 34
TORT & INS. L.J. 115, 115 (1998).
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confronted mediation legislation and produced different
results." This "split" among court decisions presents the
question: will courts deferentially adhere to legislation
protecting mediation confidentiality, even if disallowing vital
and relevant evidence would cause an unjust disservice to one
party?2' In other words, how strong is the armor of the
mediation legislation?
The analysis discusses tests the courts have implemented
to determine the admissibility of mediation communication as
evidence. 2 This comment assumes that parties have entered
into mediation to produce a mutually satisfying result. If the
agreement carries no legal weight, even an apparently
successful mediation can fail.
Therefore, this comment
proposes that traditional contract law govern finalized
agreements, with the mediation privilege applying only to
agreements which are not finalized.2 This comment also
advocates the right of parties to choose to create a
confidential, non-binding agreement if they wish. 4
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Processof Mediation

1. Common Characteristicsof Mediation
Mediations vary tremendously in style, form, and
process,25 but common elements underlie all mediations. All
mediation involves one or more neutral third parties.26 The
mediation process empowers the disputing parties to resolve
disagreements on their own terms," with the mediator acting
as guide, facilitator, or referee, but not as judge. 8 Unlike
20. See infra Part II.B.2-5.
21. See infra Part IV.C-D.
22. See infra Part IV.D.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122 (West 1997) (requiring parties to
expressly waive mediation privilege for the document produced from the
mediation to be admissible as evidence).
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. For example, some programs use a
panel of volunteer mediators, some use just one person. See id.
26. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990); see also CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1115(a).
27. See infra Part II.A.1.
28. See Michael J. Roberts, Why Mediation Works (visited Jan. 30, 2001)
<http://www.mediate.com/articles/roberts.cfm>.
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9
litigation, where laws are used to resolve a dispute,
mediation relies on the parties themselves to find a solution.
This allows the parties to determine highly unique and
individualized solutions.
Mediation agreements vary greatly in complexity,
ranging from simple written apologies to complex peace
Mediation attempts to discover underlying,
treaties. 0
sometimes emotional, issues that form the basis of many
disputes. For example, the mediation process may reveal the
"true" issue in a financial dispute to be an emotional one,
such as the simple desire of one or both parties to feel
"heard." On the other hand, mediation can and often does
involve legal issues, tremendous sums of money, and other
external considerations.

2. The Need for "Privileged"Communication
Regardless of the underlying issues involved, the
mediation process fundamentally relies on the parties' ability
to communicate openly with each other and discover common
ground for negotiation. Parties often must concede on some
issues, and likewise will gain on others. A sample mediation
agreement describes this process:
Mediation is an approach to resolving disputes on a nonadversary basis. Through the process of mediation you
have the opportunity to negotiate your own settlement
rather than have one imposed upon you by an attorney or
judge. Successful mediation requires recognition by both
parties that each must consider the position of the other,
each must be willing to compromise and that neither
should have to "win" or "lose."31
The possibility that a party could use mediation
discussions in litigation would severely impede the
atmosphere of candor central to the mediation process. For
example, in the introductory hypothetical involving Daren
and Paula, 2 Daren will admit he owes Paula money in the
context of "protected" mediation. He maintains control of
29. The definition of "litigation" includes: "lawsuit," "legal action," and
DICTIONARY 934 (6th ed. 1990).

"judicial contest." BLAcK'S LAW
30. See

DONALD

G.

GIFFORD,

LEGAL

NEGOTIATION,

THEORY

AND

APPLICATION 48 (1989).
31. Letter from Martha Uelmen, Attorney, Law and Mediation Offices of
Martha A. Uelmen, to clients (2000) (on file with author).
32. See supra Part I.
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whatever solution the parties ultimately devise, knowing that
if the mediation process breaks down, the opposing party
cannot use his statements, opinions, offers, and confessions as
a weapon against him in further proceedings.
B.

Utilization of the MediationProcess

1. A HistoricalView
Settlement negotiations have accompanied litigation for
centuries," and resemble mediation in that they rely upon
open communication and flexibility.3 4 Through settlement
negotiations, the two parties hope to resolve their case and
avoid a protracted and disagreeable court battle.
Federal legislation protecting settlement negotiations"
laid the groundwork for current mediation privilege
legislation. As states have enacted protections, concerns
about eliminating important evidence from admissibility in
legal proceedings have emerged.37 Nevertheless, public policy
reasons for encouraging settlements have outweighed
countervailing concerns, and judges frequently refer to
federal confidentiality protections. 8 States have enacted even
stronger versions of protection in the form of mediation
privileges, such as section 1119 of the California Evidence
Code. s
2.

Community Conflict Resolution Programs

Many communities now offer programs designed to help
people resolve disputes without going to court." Community

33. "[A]Ill the Illinois tribes then remaining, made a treaty of peace with
Great Britain, and a treaty of peace, limits, and amity, under her mediation,
with Six Nations, or Iroquois, and their allies .... " Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. 543, 549 (1823) (emphasis added).
34. See GIFFORD, supra note 30, at 32-36.
35. See id. at 184-85.
36. See FED. R. EvID. 408.
37. See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., S. REP. No. 1277, at 10

(1974) (voicing a variety of concerns about the Federal Rules of Evidence that
protect offers to compromise).
38. Over 2,300 citations referred to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 410.
Search of WESTLAW (Mar. 5, 2001).
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 1997).

40. E.g., Community Boards of San Francisco, 1540 Market St., Ste. 490,
San Francisco, CA 94102.
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Boards of San Francisco (CBSF)," for example, provides a nocost, fair, and effective way for disputing parties to reach
their own agreements.4" The disputing parties meet with a
panel of trained volunteers who listen, guide, and steer the
Other
parties toward discovering their own solution.
localized programs follow nearly identical processes."
Community based mediation programs demonstrate
awareness of recent legislation protecting mediation" and
rely heavily on it.45 However, a blind-faith belief that
protective legislation is binding and infallible may be
Consequently, these programs may not
misguided.
adequately inform their clients of possible legal ramifications
resulting from mediation. In Rinaker v. Superior Court,46 the
defendants, both minors, attempted to resolve a dispute with
the plaintiff through a community mediation program.
During the mediation, the plaintiff made statements that
clearly exculpated the defendants." Later, the defendants
sought to call the mediator to testify about the statements
made by the plaintiff during mediation. 8 The mediator
The
refused to testify, claiming absolute privilege.4 9
defendants claimed that without such testimony the court

41. Id.
42. See id.
43. E.g., Conflict Resolution Center of Santa Cruz County (CRC), 783 Rio
Del Mar Blvd., Ste. 65, Aptos, CA 95003.
44. See, e.g., COMMUNITY BOARDS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT (1999) (on

file with author). A Community Boards brochure says: "Agreements may be
oral or written. While not legally binding, they represent the participants'
COMMUNITY BOARDS,
commitment to the resolution of their dispute."
STRUGGLING WITH A CONFLICT (emphasis added). The literature from CRC
states "mediation is a non-binding process," and that all "mediation discussion
and materials are to be privileged and confidential," and that section 1-152.5 of
the California Evidence Code applies to all proceedings. CRC, MEDIATION AND
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT (1999) (on file with author). Observe that the
reference to section 1152.5 of the California Evidence Code is wrong because
that section was superseded by sections 1115 to 1128 of the Evidence Code.
45. See, e.g., COMMUNITY BOARDS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT, supra

note 44. "For mediation to be successful, the participants must feel free to
discuss the issues openly. In order to promote this communication, we agree
that all statements and written documents made during the course of the
mediation are confidential and cannot be used in legal proceedings." Id.
46. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
47. See id. at 467.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 468. The statutory provisions referred to in the case are fully
discussed. See infra Part II.C.
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court agreed with the defendants, ignored the new legislation
in the interest of justice, and ordered the mediator's
testimony heard.51
In The Regents of the University of California v.
Sumner,52 the parties settled a prior action using a
community mediation program." They reached an agreement
and the "terms of the settlement were dictated into a tape
recorder by [counsel]."" The parties signed a written contract
which included the terms transcribed from the tape
recording.55 Later, however, the defendant had "second
thoughts about the matter," 6 and the California appellate
court had to decide whether to admit the contract as evidence.
According to traditional contract law, the court could fully
enforce the signed agreement. However, defendant relied on
legislation protecting anything produced in a mediation as
privileged,58 and also relied on Ryan v. Garcia,59 which upheld
a mediation privilege." The court overruled Ryan, adopting
the dissenting view,6 and upheld the contract as
enforceable.
The appellate court found that defendant
waived her privilege because she introduced the transcript of
the dictated settlement into evidence,63 and therefore had no
grounds to object later. Additionally, although the parties
agreed upon the terms during the mediation, they wrote the
50. See Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
51. See id. at 473. Because there were minors involved with this case, it
may be arguable that the holding is limited to cases concerning minors.
Nevertheless, this is an example of the mediation legislation not being strictly
followed. See infra Part II.C.3. But see Ryan v. Garcia, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (strictly adhering to legislation protecting communications
made during a mediation).
52. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
53. See id. at 201. The name of the program was Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services, which utilized retired judges to preside over the mediation.
See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 202.
57. See id. at 201.
58. See Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. For a discussion on the legislation
relied upon, see supra Part 1I.C.1.
59. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
60. See id. at 162.
61. See id. at 203.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 202.
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contract after the mediation concluded.64 The court held the
contract existed not "pursuant to" the mediation, but separate
from it.6" Therefore, since the parties did not draft the
contract during the mediation, the court held protective
legislation inapplicable. 6 For these two reasons, the Sumner
court distinguished Ryan, although the court indicated it
would not have followed Ryan regardless because the court
disagreed with Ryan's holding.67
3. Court-OrderedMediations
The benefits of mediation68 extend beyond the parties to
the courts themselves, as any successfully mediated dispute
removes the case from the courts. The last decade has seen a
tremendous increase in court-ordered mediation.69 Many
communities mandate mediation before allowing a case to go
to trial. ° Some small claims courts provide mediation
services at the courthouse,7 ' requiring that the claimant
mediate on the day of the hearing, and only allowing the
hearing to proceed if mediation fails.72
Court-ordered mediations do not always provide parties
with actual text of legal statutes governing mandated
Instead they provide an "agreement to
mediation.73
mediate, " 74 similar to language

utilized

by community

mediation programs.75 These agreements emphasize the
everything said or
mediation,"is and
of mediation
confidential
not that
admissible as evidence
result of
as a nature
written

64. See id.
65. See Ryan, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202.
66. See id. at 203.
67. See id.
68. See supra Part I (discussing the benefits of mediation).
69. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested,
Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 582 (1997).
70. See AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE, SANTA CRUZ COUNTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT
(1999) [hereinafter AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE] (on file with author).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.

75. For example, one agreement to mediate states in part, "a negotiated
settlement is not a matter of public record, and is more likely to be honored by

both parties. As an added protection for the claimant, our agreement form
carries a clause which allows it to be converted to a judgment should the debtor
default." Id.
76. See AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE, supra note 70.
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in a court of law.77 These court-ordered mediations may
mislead the parties for two reasons. First, the legislation
does provide methods to expressly exempt the mediation
privilege," which are not mentioned in the agreement to
mediate. Second, it is unclear whether a resultant contract,
signed by the parties and approved by a judge, carries any
legal authority.
In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.," the federal court
examined the confidentiality of a court-ordered mediation. °
Olam had first sued Congress Mortgage Company (CMC) in
state court regarding violations of the Truth in Lending Act.81
That court suggested the parties attempt to resolve their
differences in a mediation.82
Both parties agreed, and
through
mediation
produced
a
memorandum
of
understanding that embodied their agreement." In Olam,
CMC attempted to enforce this memorandum in federal court.
Olam claimed the mediation privilege protected the
memorandum, that the memorandum constituted an
unconscionable contract, and that she never understood the
mediation process. 4 CMC claimed both parties signed the
memorandum making it legally enforceable.8 5

According to

CMC, Olam "expressly waived any privileges she might have
held for communications with the mediator." 6 The Olam
court applied a balancing test, comparing the need for
relevant evidence with the need for protecting confidentiality
in mediation.87 The district court noted that the mediator
knew of crucial and highly probative evidence about central,
factual issues.88 The mediator's testimony thus would greatly
improve the court's ability to determine the pertinent
historical facts.88 After weighing the competing concerns, the
court commented, "It became clear that the mediator's
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122-1123.
68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
See id.
See id. at 1113.
See id. at 1115.
See id. at 1117.
See id. at 1118.
See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
Id.
See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1136.
See id.
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testimony was essential to doing justice here-so we decided
to use it and unseal it."90
4. PrivateAttorneys Specializing in Mediation
Although the mediation model empowers disputants to
resolve their own problems with minimal or no professional
advice, many disputants feel that awareness of governing
laws and potential judicial outcomes strengthen their
positions. Some disputants retain attorneys to counsel them
on governing law and legal options. With legal counsel, they
enter into mediation with a more concrete sense of how much
they may gain or lose, and ultimately establish a bottom
line." Other disputants fear they would make poor advocates
for themselves in a mediation, and therefore hire attorneys to
speak for them. 2
In many situations, especially with corporate disputants,
mediation intertwines with substantial legal details,
necessitating the assistance of attorneys during the
proceedings. 3 In multi-party mediations, or mediations
involving one large party, the process can include a complex
negotiation worked out between numerous attorneys. The
goal is to reach an agreement that complies with the law,
avoids costly litigation, and serves the interest of all parties.
Some attorneys now specialize in mediation. In Ryan v.
Garcia,4 the parties hired a private mediator to resolve a
dispute regarding negligent construction and fraud.9 Before
beginning mediation, the parties signed a confidentiality
agreement which included the exact language of the statute
protecting confidentiality.96 After five hours of negotiating
with the private mediator, the parties reached an oral
agreement.97 Later, plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement
and relied on statements made during the mediation. 9 The
90. Id. at 1139.
91. In legal negotiation theory, a party's "bottom line" is referred to as the
"Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement," or "BATNA." DONALD G.
GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION, THEORY AND APPLICATION 51

(1989).

92. See generally Jonathan M. Hyman, Slip-Sliding into Mediation: Can
Lawyers Mediate their Clients' Problems?, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 47 (1998).
93. See id.
94. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
95. See id. at 159.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 160.
98. See id.
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trial court admitted the statements into evidence and
plaintiff won his case.99 However, the appellate court
reversed, ' citing mediation legislation and other public
policy reasons... for shielding communications made during
mediation. A notable dissent states: "[Tihe majority goes too
far in imposing limits on the ability of parties to enter into
enforceable oral agreements."'
The dissent indicated that
after the parties reach an agreement in a mediation, a
privilege should not protect any statements regarding the
agreement.'
In Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 104
opposing parties utilized a mediator to resolve a contract
dispute.'
The mediator required both parties to sign a
mediation agreement that incorporated Minnesota legislation
protecting the confidentiality of the mediation.' 6 The parties
came to an agreement, wrote a contract, and signed it.' 7
Initially the parties followed the terms of their handwritten
contract in good faith.' 8 Later, defendant breached, and
plaintiff moved to enforce the agreement.' 9 The district court
allowed the contract as evidence and found for plaintiff."0 On
appeal, the court submitted the issue to the Minnesota
Supreme Court because the issue turned on construction of
state law regarding the mediation privilege. The court
stated, "The statute's plain language rendered the
handwritten document unenforceable, even if that result was
unintended.""' The circuit court then stated: "we are bound
by that decision,"'. and ruled the contract inadmissible as
evidence, reversing the lower court."'

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
See Ryan, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
See id. at 160-61.
Id. at 164.
See id.
173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1087.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Haghighi, 173 F.3d at 1087.
Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1089.
See id.
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5. Other Forms of Mediation
Mediation benefits disputing parties in a variety of
circumstances114 including plea bargaining, settlement
In Hooters of
negotiations, and employment contracts.
5
an in-house
adopted
America, Inc. v. Phillips," Hooters
6
Every employee signed an
dispute resolution program."
obligatory agreement to submit to in-house mediation in
7
order to receive "raises, transfers, and promotions."" When
plaintiff brought a sexual harassment suit, Hooters
intervened, claiming violation of the agreement to mediate,
and mandated plaintiffs participation in its in-house
program." 8 The Fourth Circuit found the Hooters mediation
program "so one sided that their only possible purpose [was]
9
to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding,"" and that the
program was "crafted to ensure a biased decisionmaker
[sic]."12

As a consequence, the court deemed the agreement-

to-mediate unenforceable and permitted the plaintiff to
proceed with her case. Although Hooters did not involve
confidentiality, it demonstrated two points. First, some
employers now require employees to mediate before bringing
suit.,,, Second, courts can simply throw out the agreement to
mediate.

122

In Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health
Plans,2 ' the issue of confidentiality in settlement negotiations
emerged. The district court stated:
Today, the Court is faced with a somewhat more
attenuated concern: whether the "imperative need for
confidence and trust" that would support creation of a
privilege protecting confidential communications with a
mediator should extend so far as to protect all oral and
written

communications

between

the parties

to a

mediation.12
114. See Michael J. Roberts, Why Mediation Works (visited Jan. 30, 2001)
<httpJ/www.mediate.com/articlesroberts.cfm>.
115. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
116. See id. at 935.
117. Id. at 936.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 938.
120. Id.
121. See Hooters, 173 F.3d 933.
122. See id.
123. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
124. Id. at 1172.
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The parties in Folb participated in a mediation125 and
signed a contract "agreeing to maintain the confidentiality of
the mediation and all statements made in it."'26 At trial,
plaintiff attempted to compel defendant to produce a brief
used during mediation as well as notes regarding settlement
communications.'2 7
The opinion discussed at length the
mediation privilege,2 8 the public policy reasons which support
such a privilege,'29 and various case holdings. 3 ' The court
upheld the mediation privilege, denying Folb's attempt to
compel the evidence. 3 ' The court went further, asserting "we
should adopt a federal mediation privilege.
While the
contours of such a federal privilege need to be fleshed out over
time.., it is appropriate, in light of reason and experience, to
adopt a federal mediation privilege ....
C.

New Legislation ProtectingConfidentiality in Mediation

1. Protectionfor Disputantsin Californiaand Other
States
The states have responded to the growth of mediation132
with rigorous protections for anything said or written during
a mediation. Recent California legislation says in part:
(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made
for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a
mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or
subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall
not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative
adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding
in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to
be given.
125. See id. at 1167.
126. Id.
127. See id.

128. See id. at 1178-80.
129. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. "[Sluccessful mediation requires open
communication between parties to a dispute." Id. at 1173. However, the court
also provides a counter-argument: "[W]hile a certain level of confidentiality may
be necessary to make mediation effective, 'it is wrong to assume that mediation
needs absolute confidentiality."' Id. (quoting Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality
in
Mediation:A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 26).
130. See id. at 1171.
131. See id. at 1180-81.
132. Id. at 1179.
133. See generally David M. Stern, Mediation: An Old Dog with Some New
Tricks, 24 LITIGATION 31 (1998).
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(b) No writing.., that is prepared for the purpose of, in
the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation ... is admissible

or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall
not be compelled.., in any proceeding in which, pursuant
to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.
(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement
discussions by and between participants in the course of a
mediation or4 a mediation consultation shall remain
confidential.1
Three important exceptions to the mediation privilege
exist in California."' First, the privilege does not extend to
136 Second,
evidence otherwise discoverable outside mediation.
all persons involved in a mediation may "expressly agree in
37
writing" to disclose the contents of the mediation.' Third, a
party may not attempt to protect evidence from disclosure
3
solely by introducing it in a mediation."
'
Most states have some type of mediation legislation.
According to the Folb court, "every state in the Union, with
the exception of Delaware, has adopted a mediation privilege
of one type or another."4 ° Some states have very broad
legislation to protect mediation proceedings,' containing few
exceptions, while others provide minimal protection.'
2. Protectionfor the Mediator
For mediation to remain confidential, an exemption from
testifying as to information learned pursuant to the
mediation process must apply to all parties privy to such
To achieve this protection, many states
information.
134. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 1997).
135. See infra Part II.C.3.
136. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120(a).
137. See id. § 1122(a)(1).

138. See id. § 1120(a). I call this the "smoking gun" exception, because if a
party has a highly incriminating piece of evidence (a smoking gun), it cannot be
introduced during a mediation with the sole purpose of excluding it from
admissibility in later proceedings. "Evidence otherwise admissible or subject to
discovery outside of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall not be or
become inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by reason of its
introduction or use in a mediation." Id.
139. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp.
2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
140. Id.
141. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128.
142. See, e.g., Daniel R. Conrad, Confidentiality Protection in Mediation:
Methods and PotentialProblems in North Dakota, 74 N.D. L. REV. 45, 59 n.40.
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specifically prohibit mediators from testifying with respect to
mediation communication.1 4 3 This serves two purposes. First,
it protects the disputants from the introduction of mediation
communication into evidence in court disputes. Second, it
encourages community members to volunteer their services
as mediators without fear of having to later testify in court.4
The California Evidence Code provides protection for
mediators:
Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court
or other adjudicative body, and a court or other
adjudicative body may not consider, any report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any
kind by the mediator concerning a mediation conducted by
the mediator, other than a report that is mandated by
court rule or other law ....
145
Thus, mediators receive strong protection in California.
Some states have enacted even stronger protection. 146 For
example, Florida's statutory protection for mediators
approaches an absolute immunity. "7 In Florida, mediators
"shall have judicial immunity in the same manner
and to the
48
same extent as a judge."
3. Limits and Exceptions to the Legislation
Generally confidentiality statues protect only civil
cases,1 9 and immunity does not apply to subsequent criminal
proceedings. 5 ° The California legislation provides for the
admissibility of communications or writings made "for the
purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation"'
if "[a]ll persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the
mediation expressly agree in writing, or orally . . . to
143. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5.
144. See CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CENTER OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY,
INFORMATION STATEMENT ("Participation in the Conflict Resolution Center

mediation process is voluntary, both by you and by the mediators." (emphasis
added)) (on file with author).
145. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1121.

146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107 (West 1997).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119.
150. But see Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (demonstrating that the mediation privilege applies to juvenile
delinquency hearings because they are not considered criminal cases, even
though incarceration is possible).
151. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122(a).
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disclosure of the communication, document, or writing.
Further, California exempts from the mediation privilege any
1 53
signed agreement which expressly states enforceability.
Other states have similar exemptions. North Dakota
provides exceptions for evidence that "relates to a breach of
duty by the mediator""4 or where the "validity of the mediated
agreement is in issue."15' Oregon provides exceptions for
6
statements made concerning child abuse or elder neglect"
to enforce, modify or set aside a
and for "any proceeding
17
mediation agreement."
Case law continues to carve out exceptions to mediation
immunity or to hold that communications made during
15 8
protections.
mediation do not fall within statutory
Dissecting the language of a statute becomes paramount,
especially with precise definitions of "mediation," "mediator,"
"pursuant to," and "waiver." For example, a statute may or
may not extend to words spoken just before a formal
mediation begins, or just after completing a mediation,
depending upon the interpretation of the term "pursuant to"
(the mediation).
4. FederalProtection
a. FederalRules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide an express
mediation privilege. "Except as otherwise required by the
Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court,
[privileges] shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
Thus, the Federal Rules do not specifically
States.""'
but instead defer to state or common
privileges,
delineate
60
law.
152. Id. § 1122(a)(1).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 1123(b).

The contract must state on it that "it is

enforceable or binding or words to that effect." Id.
154. Conrad, supra note 142, at 53.

155. Id.
156. See OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(6) (1998).

157. Id. § 36.222(4).
158. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
159. FED. R. EVID. 501.
160. But see FED. R. EVID.: DELETED AND SUPERSEDED MATERIALS 501-513.
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The federal scheme of deferring to the states does not
necessarily discourage the application of privileges. The Folb
court commented that the purpose of Rule 501 "was to
provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of

privilege on a case-by-case basis . . . and to leave the door

open to change."16 '
The Federal Rules of Evidence have attempted to provide
some protection for certain kinds of communications in the
public interest.'62
Though no federal rule specifically
addresses mediation immunity, section 408 of the Federal
Rule of Evidence comes closest. Section 408 says in part:
"Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish,
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is
not admissible to prove liability."6 ' However, the rule does
not protect against using any such evidence for another
purpose.'64 The notes following the rule state that the
"purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which
would
be discouraged if such evidence were admissible."'65
b. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 and the
Uniform MediationAct
While the wave of mediation legislation at the state level
rose from over 100 statutes to over 2,500 statutes,'66 Congress
has enacted an act of its own, the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 (ADRA). 67 The ADRA mandates that
every federal district authorize the use of alternative dispute
resolution processes in all civil actions. 6 ' Further provisions
set out definitions1 69 and provide for "program support" to
establish and improve these programs.'7 ° The ADRA does not
161. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
162. See FED. R. EVID. 407-408.
163. FED. R. EVID. 408 (emphasis added).
164. See id.
165.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF

EVIDENCE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., S. REP. NO. 1277, at 10 (1974).

166. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, supra note 69, at 577; see also Draft of the
Uniform Mediation Act, Prefatory Note (Nov. 2000) <http://www.mediate.comI
articles/umanovemberdraft.cfm>
167. 28 U.S.C. § 651 (1998).
168. See id.

169. See id. § 651(a).
170. See id. § 651(f).

20011

CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION

1111

provide any immunities for participants of a mediation, but
promulgates the use of mediations by the federal district
courts.
The ABA and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law are jointly drafting a Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA).' 7' The purpose of the UMA is to create
one set of rules followed by both federal courts and all fifty
states. This concerns advocates of the mediation privilege
because the UMA will attempt to forge a middle ground
between various existent statutes, potentially resulting in
72
less protection for mediation proceedings in many states.
The current draft of the UMA states, "There is no privilege
[ill there is a need for the evidence that substantially
outweighs the importance of the policy favoring the protection
Further, the UMA lacks explicit
of confidentiality."'73
protections for mediator reports, intake records, and
attorney's fees. 7 ' On the other hand, the Act will increase
confidentiality for many states and
protection of mediation
175
the federal courts.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
An inherent conflict exists between encouraging
mediation protections and discovering truth. If courts uphold
confidentiality legislation, then courts may prohibit
admission into evidence of relevant, possibly crucial
communications.
Society benefits when people mediate their differences
and come to a peaceful, non-adjudicatory agreement.
Privileged communication allows disputants entering into a
mediation to say anything and everything, to put "all the
cards" out on the table. 76 On the other hand, truth and
justice form the pillars of the judicial system, making it
171. Draft of the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 166.
172. See Ron Kelly, Letter to UMA Drafters Identifying Key Positive Aspects
and Remaining Problems in Current Draft (last modified Dec. 2000)
<http://www.ronkelly.com/RonKellyMedAct.html>.
173. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
November 2000 Draft of the Uniform Mediation Act § 8(5)(b). The Act is
<http://www.mediate.com/articles/
URL
the
at
online
available
umanovemberdraft.cfm>.
174. See id.
175. The current draft has passed the first several hurdles toward becoming
law, but remains in the law-making process.
176. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West 1997).
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necessary to compel discovery of agreements or testimony
made during a mediation in order for courts to make fair and
accurate rulings.
The rise in mediation practice makes the dilemma
increasingly evident.'77 The more mediation, the more likely
issues will surface, especially in subsequent legal
proceedings. Therefore, it is of timely concern that disputants
involved in a mediation know to what extent they can speak
freely, and whether they can legally enforce any agreements
made.
Mediation agencies, programs, and attorneys utilize
confidentiality agreements to accurately inform disputants of
governing laws.'78 Currently, however, these laws do not
clearly state whether confidentiality extends to all
communications made during mediation. Courts have held
written, signed contracts unenforceable in order to uphold
legislative protection of confidentiality.'
Other courts have
not upheld the privilege, hoping to discover truth and enforce
justice.'8°
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Successful MediationDepends upon Privileged
Communication
Mediation allows parties to formulate a solution that
works for all involved. Parties approach the table with a hope
(sometimes faint) that a solution lies hidden in the mess of
their complex conflict. The parties haggle, talk, and listen,
proposing any idea that comes to mind, until a workable
resolution begins to gel. For that to happen, all parties must
share information openly. Exposing weaknesses, giving up
some demands, and discovering new common ground are
frequent occurrences in mediation. In support of the need for
open communication, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
commented, "the complete exclusion of mediator testimony is
necessary"'8 ' for effective mediation. Likewise, the Folb court
177.
178.
179.
1999).
180.
1998).
181.

See Kovach, supra note 69, at 577.
See Uelmen, supra note 31.
See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir.
See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct. App.
NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F. 2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
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commented on the importance of a mediation privilege:
"Refusing to establish a privilege to protect confidential
communications in mediation proceedings creates an
incentive for participants to withhold sensitive information in
mediation or refuse to participate at all." 82
However, for every protected communication, the justice
system potentially loses evidence that may lead to the truth.
"The general rule is that the public is entitled to every
person's evidence and that testimonial privileges are
disfavored.' 18 3 Creation of a statutory privilege may have
drastic results because it would exclude any evidence that fell
under its umbrella, even highly relevant evidence, or perhaps
the only evidence in a case. To follow a protective statute and
disallow evidence may result in a travesty of justice. The
mediation privilege could result in unfair or even unjust
consequences.
The mediation privilege also produces benefits. Anything
said in a mediation process might never have been said
without the protective privilege. The privilege results in the
availability of additional information between the parties
that enables them to resolve their conflict in an effective
manner. Thus, a dichotomy exists. Strong protection of
confidentiality encourages mediation but introduces possible
injustice by suppressing all communications from later
judicial proceedings. However, revoking such privilege would
likely stifle the mediation process.
As an indication of future trends, most states have
chosen to encourage mediation, even at the expense of losing
Mediation is presently gaining
some potential evidence.'
allowing participants to
legislation
enacting
are
favor. States
confidentially communicate in mediations.
B.

An "Absolute"Privilege Would Not Serve Its Intended
Purpose, Therefore a "Partial"Privilege Is Appropriate
Under the muzzle of absolute privilege,'8 5 truth suffers

182. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
183. Id. at 1171.
184. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
185. A true "absolute privilege" would enable the holder of confidential
information to not disclose it under any and all circumstances, whether criminal
or civil. Even the constitutional right of a defendant to not testify against
himself is not absolute because it is limited to criminal cases. See CAL. EVID.
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tremendously. For this reason, the law discourages absolute
privilege, even holding the attorney-client privilege as
partial.'86 It follows that the mediation privilege, although
necessary,' 87 must be partial. In constructing language for a
partial privilege, it is necessary to draw a line somewhere.
For example, California statutes attempt to illuminate such a
line in mediation, and delineate exactly what communication
is protected.'88
If an "absolute" privilege existed, then anything resulting
from a mediation would remain shrouded in legal protection
and neither party could enforce an agreement. Even with a
signed agreement, either party could decide to breach at any
point, and litigation would follow. The hard work involved in
a mediation would count for nothing, and the parties would
have to start over using the traditional litigation process
(wishing they had never gone to mediation). Even a zealous
advocate of mediation privileges would not call for an
absolute privilege of mediation sessions, but only a partial
one.
Further, a cloak of absolute privilege would render the
mediation process vulnerable to abuse.
Parties could
intentionally reveal inculpating evidence for the sole purpose
of protecting it from any future disclosure. Disputants could
participate in a mediation, willing to say anything in order to
obtain the best deal for themselves, but never intending to
honor an agreement unless it favored them.
C. Legislative Protection
Legislators intended the mediation privilege to encourage
people to communicate openly by instituting protection from
liability for anything said. On its face, this provides powerful
protection for anyone choosing to utilize mediation. But does
this privilege mislead people? In Rinaker, the defendant
asked the court to uphold the mediation privilege,' 9 and the
court refused to do so, saying that confidentiality must yield
to the right to impeach a witness.' ° The Rinaker decision did
CODE § 930 (West 1997).
186. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1997).
187. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
188. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128.

189. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
190. See id. at 469.
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not force the mediator to testify outright, but remanded the
case requesting the trial court to conduct an in camera
hearing to decide the necessity of the mediator's testimony.' 91
The Rinaker decision leaves us to ponder whether the courts
will uphold the mediation privilege when doing so may clearly
infringe on justice. If the courts can uphold or deny the
mediation privilege randomly, what value does the privilege
have?
One writer suggested reciting the following to all
mediation participants (analogous to Miranda rights, but for
mediation proceedings): "You have the right to remain silent.
I may later testify against you in court. Anything you say to
me in mediation I may have to repeat in court."'92 Perhaps
this could serve as fair warning. Rinaker supports this
since the court ultimately forced the mediator to
language,
193
testify.
Likewise in Sumner, the defendants believed section
1152.5 of the California Evidence Code,' a predecessor to
section 1119,195 protected everything said in mediation. When
they attempted to exercise their assumed privilege, however,
the court found several ways around the legislation. 9" The
court quoted the dissent from Ryan: "Our views are indeed
more closely in accord with Justice Raye's dissenting opinion
in Ryan,"'97 which would have allowed oral statements into
evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.9 Both the Sumner
and Rinaker rulings demonstrate the wavering stability of
mediation "protection."
Other cases attempted to uphold a mediation privilege,
focusing on the intent of the legislature.' 99 Courts in these
191. See id.
192. Ron Kelly, Mediation Information About Mediation (posted temporarily
online Jan. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
193. See Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. The "forced" testimony was in
camera for the judge to decide whether it was constitutionally needed in court.
See id.
194. See The Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200,
202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Section 1152.5 of the California Evidence Code
required the parties to sign an agreement to mediate, which stated verbatim the
text of the Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West 1994), amended by CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West 1997).
195. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 1997).
196. See Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-03.
197. Id. at 203.
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F.
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cases seemed more willing to comply with a mediation
privilege when suppressing the evidence would not
egregiously wrong one party. In Folb, the court boldly
adopted "a federal mediation privilege applicable to all
communications made in conjunction with a formal
mediation."2 °° That may have been somewhat easier for the
court to do because the party relying on the privilege, the
plaintiff, did not have an otherwise clear-cut case, thus not
producing a sense of flagrant injustice in disallowing the
evidence.
Likewise, in Haghighi, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit followed the precise wording of the applicable
legislation,"' upholding the mediation privilege. ' ' Haghighi
may serve as the best example of a court simply enforcing a
mediation privilege and not looking beyond or around it. The
disputants had clearly created an enforceable contract,
intending that it be binding.0 3 However, the court disallowed
the contract as evidence because the parties had made it
"pursuant to" a mediation.0 4 "[T]he statute's plain language
rendered the handwritten document unenforceable, even if
that result was unintended."20 ' Haghighi, like Folb, involved
a "simple" contract case, with relatively low stakes, making it
easier for the court to adhere to the privilege. Contrast this
with Rinaker where the court refused to adhere to the
privilege.
In Rinaker, two minors were charged with
vandalism,2 6 with possible juvenile incarceration at stake;
therefore the court readily compelled the mediator to
testify. '
The Rinaker court found a constitutional
infringement on the right to cross examine a witness, which,
according to the court, superseded statutory protection
against testifying.2 8
Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994).
200. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80.
201. See Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087 (8th Cir.
1999).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1088.
206. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
207. See id. This testimony was in camera. See id.
208. See id. at 473.
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D. The Balancing Test in Olam Provides a Tempting, but
InadequateSolution.
A balancing test similar to that used in Olam may seem
to present a natural solution. After all, two competing
interests collide: the state legislation to encourage mediation
versus the need for testimony."9 The Olam court suggests
honoring both interests by "balancing" on a case by case
basis.21°
Statutory interpretation may never eliminate all judicial
balancing. The legislators attempted to foresee and eliminate
all problems a mediation privilege might create by including
language preventing abuse and injustice, while still
supporting freedom of communication inside mediation. 1'
Therefore, the courts must look at legislation carefully to
determine the extent to which a privilege applies. Further,
they must define legislative intent before ruling. A balancing
test is almost, then, requisite.
In Olam, the court thoroughly analyzed the mediation
privilege," 2 finding it to shield participants in a mediation so
that the process could thrive,' but on the other hand,
possibly producing injustice by the exclusion of perhaps the
only evidence available." 4 The Olam court set aside the
mediation privilege to reveal the truth.2"' The court wrote,
"The evidence from all sources demonstrates it is clear the
testimony from within the mediation is essential to doing
justice here."216 With those words, the court ordered the
transcripts unsealed and admitted as evidence. 7
The Olam court relied heavily on Rinaker,218
acknowledging that Rinaker had in essence created a twostage balancing test.1 9 After calling the Rinaker decision "the
most important opinion by a California court in this arena,"2 20
209. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
210. See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1131-32 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
211. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128.
212. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 1139.
217. See id. at 1151.
218. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
219. See id.
220. Id.
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the Olam court proceeded to refine that balancing test.22 ' The
court then flushed out the elements of the test. First, the
court must determine what the parties said or wrote in the
mediation and the importance of the words to the case at bar.
This first step constitutes a balancing test: "the judge
considers all the circumstances and weighs all the competing
rights and interests, including the values that would be
threatened
not by public disclosure
of mediation
communications, but by ordering the mediator to
appear ... ,,222
The court arrives at the second stage of the test only after
stage one's balancing test determines the necessity of the
proposed testimony.222 In stage two, the court must assess the
"importance of the values and interests that would be harmed
if the mediator was compelled to testify. '224 Stage two allows
the court to dictate whether to apply the mediation privilege.
The language of the legislation does not include this twostage analysis. It is entirely judge-made. With this test, the
courts can bypass legislation by deciding whether the
necessity of the protected communication is necessary to a
case and does not trample upon the sanctity of mediation.
However, the very existence of the balancing test belittles the
mediation process. Stage one alone could undermine the
interests of protecting mediation, because it allows courts to
compel an in camera hearing,22 which in itself violates the
principles of mediation. Stage two represents a more blatant
violation because the courts can force that testimony into
open court. 226
The Olam court was well aware of possible damage to the
mediation process. 221 "[Girdering mediators to participate in
proceedings arising out of mediations imposes economic and
psychic burdens that could make some people reluctant to
agree to serve as a mediator, especially in programs where
that service is pro bono or poorly compensated. 228 Yet the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 1131-32.
Id. at 1131.
See id. at 1132.
Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
See id. at 1131-32.
See id.
See id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133.
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court proceeded to utilize the test,22 9 thereby weakening the
mediation privilege.
A balancing test creates uncertainty for those who would
consider mediation as an alternative to litigation. On its face,
state legislation provides confidentiality for communication
during mediation,23 ° yet the courts can use a balancing test to
virtually destroy that promise of confidentiality. Disputants
and mediators cannot be certain that a future court will not
order them to testify. The balancing test actually encourages
caution rather than openness among prudent disputants.
This would compromise the mediation process. Therefore, the
balancing test potentially, if not certainly, harms the
mediation process, and does not represent an adequate
solution.
Mediation Seeks to Resolve Disputes, Therefore Courts
Should Enforce Agreements Made During Mediation
As an alternative to litigation, disputing parties seek an
agreement that resolves the initial problem. Any rules,
procedures, and privileges concerning mediation must serve
that ultimate purpose. If uncertainties exist regarding the
mediation process, disputants cannot rely on mediation to
best serve their interests. Legislatures and judges alike must
keep the goal of mediation-to produce an agreement
between the disputants-in the forefront of their minds while
creating laws effecting the mediation process.
It is futile to go to great extents to protect the mediation
process, but then deny the parties a right to enforce the
Many states, including California,
produced agreement.
allow parties to make their agreement binding and
enforceable in court, but the parties must utilize specific
language drafted in the legislation. Without that specific
language, a completed agreement created in a mediation may
Haghighi represents the clearest
have no legal effect.
parties had not used the exact
where
example of a situation
language required by the statute,2 3' and a later court would
not allow the contract into evidence.232 The mediation process
E.

229.
230.
231.
1999).
232.

See id.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West 1997).
See Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087 (8th Cir.
See id. at 1088.
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failed in Haghighi. Legislative protection rendered the
contract, and hence the fruit of the parties' labor,
unenforceable.
V. PROPOSAL
The popularity and success of mediation has promulgated
over 2,000 pages of legislative protection for confidentiality. 3
This confidentiality provides a unique ingredient to the
mediation process, encouraging parties to speak openly
toward reaching an agreement.
However, mediation
protection can result in finalized agreements that are nonbinding, even if written and signed to satisfy standard
contract law. The current legislation allows parties to draft
binding agreements, 2 but only with proper and precise
language.235 Without this language, these agreements are not
admissible in court and therefore not enforceable.
This
comment proposes changing the language of mediation
privileges to ensure the admissibility of mediation
agreements in court, unless the parties choose to expressly
shield the agreement from later disclosure. An agreement
represents the end result of a successful mediation, and the
parties should rely upon it. An agreement often results from
lengthy discussion and a "meeting of the minds." When a
party cannot enforce that agreement, the process has failed
them, and the integrity of mediation, as an alternative to
litigation, suffers.
In summary, basic contract law should govern all
finalized agreements, written and oral, whether created
within mediation or not. However, the parties should have
the right to expressly waive enforceability if they so choose.
The current legislation produces precisely the reverse result.
This proposal would only affect finalized agreements and
communications pertinent to them. Full protection from
disclosure should extend to anything occurring in mediation
not germane to a final agreement. No balancing test or other
considerations should allow a court to compel evidence.
233. See Kovach, supra note 69, at 582. The conclusion assumes that a
legislative statute has an average of at least one page to spell it out.
234. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122 (West 1997).
235. The proper language varies from state to state. For example, in
California, the parties must expressly agree in writing to disclosure, or a
finalized agreement must provide that it is enforceable. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§

1122(a)(1), 1123(b).
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Likewise, confidentiality protection should extend to the
entire mediation proceeding if the mediation fails to produce
an agreement. Public policy considerations behind mediation
privilege remain. Parties in mediation should not fear
subpoenas or any other compelled testimony stemming from
their words, admissions, and other communications made
during the mediation process.
VI. CONCLUSION

The mediation process requires that parties involved
speak freely and candidly. Legislatures, accordingly, have
enacted a variety of protections for the confidentiality of
communications within a mediation. Though at first a
welcome boost to the mediation process, these protections can
backfire. First, the parties themselves may be unable to
enforce a mediated agreement. Second, the "armor" of
legislative protection may fail easier than legislative intent
would dictate. Several cases have held the court's quest for
truth and justice to outweigh the privilege of confidential
mediation.236
Even if this "armor" is of steel, perhaps it is too heavy for
disputants to wear, encumbered by increasing legislation,
rules of procedure, and governing case law. Examples of
"confidential" disclosures being allowed into future legal
proceedings further plague this armor. Mediation in its pure
form may lapse into extinction, killed off by legal machinery.
Nevertheless, mediation serves as a viable, empowering, and
efficient alternative, rapidly becoming as popular as litigation
is dreaded. Legislatures must act quickly to protect the
Strictly
process of mediation and its intended result.
upholding a confidentiality privilege in all circumstances
except for written or oral agreements produced from the
mediation is one effective way to protect the mediation
process.

236. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).

